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The Leadership Act and Its Policy 
Requirement 
CHANGING LAWS, NOT REALITY 
Our focus has to be on changing reality, not changing laws.1 
-Nicholas D. Kristof and Sheryl WuDunn 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2009 alone, 2.6 million people were newly infected 
with HIV.2 With the aim of reducing the number of people 
contracting HIV/AIDS, Congress passed the United States 
Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act 
of 2003 (Leadership Act), which provides funds to encourage 
partnerships between various members of the international 
community, including several nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs).3 Such partnerships often take the form of NGO 
funding,4 administered through the U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID).5 While this may sound 
straightforward, there is a catch. 
Many of the international NGOs working on the ground 
provide programming to individuals who are identified as 
having a high risk of contracting HIV, such as sex workers. As 
a condition of Leadership Act funding, however, recipient 
organizations must affirmatively adopt a policy statement, 
which declares that the organization opposes prostitution and 
  
 1 NICHOLAS D. KRISTOF & SHERYL WUDUNN, HALF THE SKY: TURNING 
OPPRESSION INTO OPPORTUNITY FOR WOMEN WORLDWIDE 32 (2009). 
 2 JOINT UNITED NATIONS PROGRAMME ON HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), UNAIDS 
REPORT ON THE GLOBAL AIDS EPIDEMIC 16 (2010).  
 3 22 U.S.C. § 7601 (2006). While the Leadership Act contains funding and 
programs to eradicate HIV/AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis, the focus of this note is 
the portion of the Leadership Act that targets HIV/AIDS. The Leadership Act took effect 
in 2003, and Congress reauthorized the act in 2008. 22 U.S.C.A. § 7601 (West 2008). 
 4 The premise underlying such public private partnerships is that all parties 
can work together in order to best make use of each group’s individual areas of 
expertise, thereby strengthening the overall impact of preventing and treating 
HIV/AIDS throughout the developing world. 22 U.S.C. § 7621(a)(3) (2006). 
 5 22 U.S.C.A. § 7631(a) (West 2008).  
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sex trafficking (Policy Requirement).6 Failure to adopt such a 
policy renders the organization ineligible for funding through 
the Leadership Act.7  
Pathfinder International (Pathfinder), the Alliance for 
Open Society International (AOSI), and DKT International 
(DKT) are among the NGOs that have received funding 
through the Leadership Act.8 Through two separate lawsuits, 
these three NGOs have challenged the Policy Requirement’s 
legitimacy under the First Amendment.9 They claim that the 
Policy Requirement violates the First Amendment by imposing 
an unconstitutional condition on the receipt of Leadership Act 
funds.10 The outcomes of those suits have resulted in a circuit 
split, which will soon be resolved by the Supreme Court.11  
In DKT International, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for 
International Development, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit held that the federal government 
could constitutionally require its agents to convey a specific 
message and similarly require the agents to refrain from 
participating in contrary behavior or communicating a contrary 
message.12 In contrast, in Alliance for Open Society 
International v. U.S. Agency for International Development 
(AOSI), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found 
that the Policy Requirement raised significant constitutional 
concerns, and it therefore upheld preliminary injunctions 
enjoining USAID from enforcing the Policy Requirement 
against Leadership Act funding recipients.13  
This note examines the inherent contradictions that 
exist within the Leadership Act and how the statute’s Policy 
Requirement not only unconstitutionally impinges upon 
grantees’ First Amendment rights but also undermines the 
very aim of the Leadership Act itself—preventing the spread of 
HIV/AIDS. By forcing grantees to adopt the government’s anti-
prostitution stance, the Leadership Act effectively blocks NGOs 
from working with a high-risk group that would likely benefit 
  
 6 22 U.S.C. § 7631(f) (2006). 
 7 Id. 
 8 See Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 651 F.3d 
218 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 928 (2013); DKT Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency 
for Int’l Dev., 477 F.3d 758 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 9 Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, 651 F.3d at 225; DKT Int’l, 477 F.3d at 759. 
 10 Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, 651 F.3d at 225; DKT Int’l, 477 F.3d at 759. 
 11 See Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, 651 F.3d 218, cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 928 (2013). 
 12 DKT Int’l, 477 F.3d at 763-64. 
 13 Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, 651 F.3d at 223. 
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the most from education and support regarding how to prevent 
or treat HIV/AIDS—girls and women working as sex workers.  
Part I of this note outlines the key components of the 
Leadership Act. Part II surveys the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine, viewpoint-based restrictions, and the government 
speech doctrine. Part III examines the circuit split created by 
AOSI and DKT International. Part IV analyzes how the Policy 
Requirement violates grantees’ First Amendment rights and 
discusses its negative policy implications. 
I. THE LEADERSHIP ACT 
The Leadership Act’s stated purpose is to “strengthen 
and enhance United States leadership and the effectiveness of 
the United States response to the HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and 
malaria pandemics.”14 In particular, the Leadership Act 
provides resources to reduce the transmission and spread of 
HIV/AIDS among girls and women, whom the Act identifies as 
particularly vulnerable populations.15  
As part of the legislative negotiations leading up to the 
Leadership Act, Congress issued factual findings that women 
are highly susceptible to contracting HIV/AIDS due largely to 
their vulnerable social positions in many cultures.16 
Unsurprisingly, Congress also found that sex work and “other 
sexual victimization . . . degrad[e] . . . women and children.”17 
Congress acknowledged that the sex industry was one of the 
causes of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, and the Leadership Act 
notes that in Cambodia alone, up to 40 percent of sex workers 
have HIV.18 Finally, Congress stated that, according to the United 
Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), “gender issues are 
critical components in the effort to prevent HIV/AIDS.”19 
According to Congress, a strong solution to the HIV/AIDS 
crisis requires a holistic international approach that targets the 
root causes underlying the spread of HIV/AIDS.20 Congress noted 
that such an approach requires education and work on a local 
level that spurs social and behavioral changes among high-risk 
  
 14 22 U.S.C.A. § 7603 (West 2008). 
 15 Id. § 7603(3)(A), (D). 
 16 Id. § 7601(3)(B). 
 17 Id. § 7601(23). 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. § 7601(36)(C). 
 20 Id. § 7601(21). 
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populations.21 In order to implement this holistic, localized, and 
targeted approach, Congress made Leadership Act funding 
available to NGOs.22 It found that collaborative work with NGOs 
is an essential component to the international community’s 
success in its efforts to vanquish HIV/AIDS.23 Therefore, Congress 
designed the Leadership Act to prioritize the maintenance and 
development of partnerships with NGOs.24 
Congress, however, imposed a crucial and highly 
restrictive condition on its funding.25 The Policy Requirement 
reads: 
No funds made available to carry out this chapter, or any 
amendment made by this chapter, may be used to provide assistance 
to any group or organization that does not have a policy explicitly 
opposing prostitution and sex trafficking, except that this subsection 
shall not apply to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and 
Malaria, the World Health Organization, the International AIDS 
Vaccine Initiative or to any United Nations agency.26 
Concerns about the constitutionality of the Policy Requirement 
arose almost immediately. In February 2004, shortly after the 
Leadership Act took effect, the Department of Justice’s Office 
of Legal Counsel (OLC) warned that the Policy Requirement 
would be unconstitutional if applied to U.S.-based 
organizations.27 USAID heeded this warning for several months 
  
 21 Id. § 7601(21)(C) (“The magnitude and scope of the HIV/AIDS crisis demands 
a comprehensive, long-term, international response . . . including . . . development and 
implementation of national and community-based multisector strategies that address 
the impact of HIV/AIDS on the individual, family, community, and national and 
increase the participation of at-risk populations in programs designed to encourage 
behavioral and social change . . . .”). 
 22 Id. § 7631(c). 
 23 Id. § 7621(a)(4) (“Sustaining existing public-private partnerships and 
building new ones are critical to the success of the international community’s efforts to 
combat HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases around the globe.”). 
 24 Id. § 7621(b)(1) (“It is the sense of Congress that—the sustainment and 
promotion of public-private partnerships should be a priority element of the strategy 
pursued by the United States to combat the HIV/AIDS pandemic and other global 
health crises[.]”). 
 25 22 U.S.C. § 7631(e)-(f) (2006). 
 26 Id. § 7631(f). 
 27 Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 651 F.3d 
218, 225 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 928 (2013). The OLC initially refused 
to release the memorandum that cautioned that the Policy Requirement could not be 
constitutionally enforced against U.S. organizations. The Brennan Center for Justice, 
which represents AOSI, Pathfinder International, Global Health Council, InterAction 
and the Open Society Institute in the Second Circuit proceedings filed a Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) request to recover that memorandum and any other materials 
from the OLC relating to enforcement of the Policy Requirement. Brennan Ctr. for 
Justice at N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 09 Civ. 8756 (VM), 2011 
WL 4001146, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 697 F.3d 
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and did not enforce the Policy Requirement.28 In September 
2004, however, the OLC changed its position and asserted that 
“‘there are reasonable arguments to support the[] constitutionality’ 
of applying the Policy Requirement to U.S.-based organizations.”29 
So, in 2005, USAID began to enforce the Policy Requirement 
against its U.S.-based grantees.30 
In 2007, to further clarify the Policy Requirement and 
guard against legal action, the Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) and USAID promulgated guidelines 
clarifying the scope of the Policy Requirement’s application.31 
The guidelines stipulate that Leadership Act recipients may 
work with affiliate organizations that do not adopt an anti-
prostitution policy statement, as long as the recipient 
maintains “objective integrity and independence from any 
affiliated organization that engages in activities inconsistent 
with the recipient’s opposition to the practices of prostitution.”32 
Importantly, however, the guidelines fail to explain what 
constitutes activity that would be “inconsistent” with the Policy 
Requirement. The application of the Policy Requirement raised 
immediate First Amendment concerns under the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine and spurred additional 
discussion of the government speech doctrine, both of which 
will be explained in depth in the following section. 
II. THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS DOCTRINE, 
VIEWPOINT BASED DISCRIMINATION, AND THE RISE OF 
THE GOVERNMENT SPEECH DOCTRINE  
This part outlines the jurisprudence forming the core of 
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, explains viewpoint-
  
184, 208-09 (2d Cir. 2012). To date, the OLC has released a portion of the 
February 2004 memorandum, though with large portions redacted. 
Constitutionally Permissible Funding Restrictions for Sex Trafficking and 
HIV/AIDS Prevention, Brennan Ctr. for Justice at N.Y. Univ. Sch. Of Law v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, 2011 WL 4001146, (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2011) (No. 09-cv-8756-VM), 
available at http://brennan.3cdn.net/2fdb4d2e5c42284e0a_fcm6bxtl3.pdf. 
 28 Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, 651 F.3d at 225 (alteration in original). 
 29 Id. (quoting the OLC). The OLC declined to release the September 2004 
opinion that deemed the Policy Requirement to be constitutional. The U.S. District 
Court for the Southern District of New York granted the Brennan Center’s FOIA 
request in August 2011. Brennan Ctr. for Justice at N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, 2011 WL 
4001146, at *7. However, the September 2004 OLC memorandum was not covered by 
the court’s order. Brennan Ctr. for Justice at N.Y. Univ. Sch. Of Law v. U. S. Dep’t of 
Justice, 697 F.3d 184, 208-09 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 30 Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, 651 F.3d at 225. 
 31 Id. at 225-26. 
 32 45 C.F.R. § 89.3 (2010) (emphasis added). 
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based discrimination, and discusses the government speech 
doctrine. The confusing and complicated nature of the doctrines 
and relevant case law led to the circuit split between DKT 
International and AOSI, and the Supreme Court should aim to 
clarify the doctrines when it decides AOSI. 
A. The Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine 
Congress passed the Leadership Act pursuant to the 
Spending Clause of the Constitution, which grants it the power 
to “provide for the common Defense and general Welfare of the 
United States.”33 Pursuant to its spending power, Congress may 
condition its award of funding on compliance with “federal 
statutory and administrative directives.”34 This concept has 
given rise to the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, which at 
its most basic level, stands for the idea that the federal 
government may not condition the “receipt of a benefit or 
subsidy [in a manner that impinges] upon a recipient’s 
constitutionally protected rights.”35  
Analysis under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine 
contains two key elements: a “conditioned government benefit”36 
and an “affected constitutional right.”37 The unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine applies to all government-conferred benefits, 
even gratuitous benefits—that is, those benefits that the 
government was not compelled to provide in the first place,38 
such as funding through the Leadership Act. Importantly, the 
government cannot grant a benefit on a whim or without 
reason; benefits and spending must be in pursuit of the 
“general Welfare of the United States.”39  
  
 33 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 34 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 35 Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, 651 F.3d at 231 (citing Perry v. Sinderman, 
408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)). Scholar Kathleen Sullivan explains that, “Unconstitutional 
conditions problems arise when government offers a benefit on condition that the 
recipient perform or forego an activity that a preferred constitutional right normally 
protects from government interference.” Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional 
Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1421-22 (1989). Once a benefit impinges on a 
constitutionally protected right, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine then dictates 
that the condition is subject to strict scrutiny. Id. 
 36 Sullivan, supra note 35, at 1422. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Kathleen Sullivan characterizes such benefits as “gratuities” or “matters of 
political grace to be deferentially reviewed.” Id. at 1424. 
 39 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; Dole, 483 U.S. at 207; Sullivan, supra note 35, 
at 1425 n.35. 
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While the unconstitutional conditions doctrine applies 
to all benefits, the doctrine applies only to those constitutional 
rights that turn on the “exercise of autonomous choice by the 
rightholder,”40 such as freedom of speech. In order to trigger the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine, the right in question must 
be one that is subject to strict scrutiny, a standard of review 
dictating that a government condition that impinges on a 
constitutionally protected right is unconstitutional unless “it is 
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.”41 
The Second Circuit, through its synthesis of Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, found that the infringements on speech in AOSI 
and DKT International are subject to strict scrutiny.42 
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine and its 
corresponding case law have been characterized as a “minefield”43 
and a “troubled area of jurisprudence in which a court ought not 
entangle itself unnecessarily.”44 This note examines the 
ambiguities of the doctrine, which lie at the heart of the circuit 
split. While there are numerous Supreme Court cases that 
analyze the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, the cases of 
Regan v. Taxation with Representation,45 FCC v. League of 
Women Voters of California,46 and Rust v. Sullivan47 provide the 
basis for the unconstitutional conditions doctrine’s application 
in AOSI and DKT International. 
In Regan, Taxation With Representation (TWR), a 
nonprofit organization, filed suit after the Internal Revenue 
Service denied its application for tax exempt status under 
§ 501(c)(3) because TWR engaged in substantial political 
lobbying, which § 501(c)(3) prohibits.48 Under Regan, the Court 
held that Congress’s choice to decline to subsidize TWR’s 
political lobbying did not violate that organization’s First 
Amendment rights, and therefore the denial of subsidies was 
  
 40 Sullivan, supra note 35, at 1426. 
 41 FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 380 (1984); Sullivan, 
supra note 35, at 1427. 
 42 Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, 651 F.3d at 236; see also Alliance for Open 
Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 430 F. Supp. 2d 222, 258-61 (S.D.N.Y. 
2006), aff’d, 651 F.3d 218 (2d Cir. 2011) (synthesizing Supreme Court unconstitutional 
conditions jurisprudence and application of strict scrutiny to instances when a 
condition improperly infringed upon a recipient’s First Amendment rights). 
 43 Sullivan, supra note 35, at 1415-16. 
 44 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 205 (1991). 
 45 461 U.S. 540 (1983). 
 46 468 U.S. 364 (1984). 
 47 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
 48 Regan, 461 U.S. at 543-45. 
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not an unconstitutional condition.49 The Court construed the 
prohibition against the use of tax-deductible donations for 
lobbying as a choice by Congress to simply not subsidize TWR’s 
lobbying activities with public funds—a decision that the Court 
previously upheld in Cammarano v. United States.50 However, 
the Court noted that if TWR made use of a dual structure, it 
could continue to use tax-deductible donations for its publishing 
and litigation activities under § 501(c)(3)51 and also receive non-
tax-deductible donations for its lobbying activities under 
§ 501(c)(4). The Court reasoned that such a structure would not 
raise constitutional concerns but rather would reflect a 
Congressional decision to provide funding to support activities it 
deemed to be in the public interest.52 The choice not to subsidize 
TWR’s lobbying activities indicated Congress’s concern that the 
organization might use public funds to “promote the private 
interests of their members”—a benefit that would effectively be 
“at the expense of taxpayers at large.”53  
A year later, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine lay 
at the heart of League of Women Voters, when the Court held that 
Congress could not constitutionally condition the receipt of a 
grant on the requirement that grantee stations refrain from any 
and all editorializing.54 The Court explained that editorializing 
warrants heavy First Amendment protections55 and held that 
restrictions on broadcast outlets may only stand when they 
satisfy heightened scrutiny—that is, when “the restriction is 
narrowly tailored to further a substantial governmental 
  
 49 Id. at 550-51. In Regan, the plaintiff, nonprofit organization Taxation 
Without Representation (TWR) filed suit after the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
denied TWR’s application for tax exempt status as a § 501(c)(3) organization. Id. at 
542. The IRS denied TWR’s application for § 501(c)(3) status because TWR engaged in 
lobbying, a prohibited activity under § 501(c)(3). TWR claimed that the prohibition 
against lobbying under § 501(c)(3) violated TWR’s First Amendment rights because it 
was an “unconstitutional condition on the receipt of tax-deductible contributions.” Id. 
at 545 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court disagreed, finding the § 501(c)(3) 
prohibition against lobbying a constitutional condition. Id. at 546. 
 50 Id. (citing Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959)). “Congress is 
not required by the First Amendment to subsidize lobbying. In these cases, as in 
Cammarano, Congress has not infringed any First Amendment rights or regulated any 
First Amendment activity. Congress has simply chosen not to pay for TWR’s lobbying.” 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 51 Id. at 544. 
 52 Id. at 550. 
 53 Id. 
 54 FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 402 (1984). 
Congress authorized the funding in question through the Public Broadcasting Act of 
1967. Id. at 366. 
 55 Id. at 375. 
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interest.”56 In this case, the ban on editorializing was insufficiently 
tailored to serve the government’s stated purpose of protecting 
local broadcast stations from improper government influence.57 
Therefore, the Court found the ban unconstitutional.58 
The Court synthesized the dual model approach of 
Regan with the reasoning of League of Women Voters in Rust v. 
Sullivan.59 In Rust, the Court found that a provision of Title X 
of the Public Health Service Act, which provided funding for 
family planning services on the condition that “[n]one of the 
funds . . . shall be used in programs where abortion is a method 
of family planning,” was constitutional.60 The Court interpreted 
the condition as a constitutionally permissible “value judgment 
favoring childbirth over abortion.”61 It reasoned that the statute’s 
limits represented the government’s decision to fund an activity 
that the government thought was in the public’s best interest 
(preventative family planning measures) and decline to fund an 
alternative family planning option (abortion).62  
Rust characterized the Title X provision as simply 
requiring that federal funds support the programs and projects 
for which they were authorized—in this case, a Title X project 
aimed to promote preventative family planning, not abortion.63 
The Court emphasized that “the [g]overnment [was] not 
denying a benefit to anyone,”64 nor was the government forcing 
grantees to refrain from discussing abortion.65 Rather, grantees 
  
 56 Id. at 380. 
 57 Id. at 389, 398-99. 
 58 Id. at 398-99. League of Women Voters revisited the dual structure outlined 
in Regan. Id. at 389. The Public Broadcasting Act did not provide a framework for 
bifurcated grantee stations, but the Court noted that if Congress amended the Public 
Broadcasting Act to allow an affiliate grantee station to editorialize with nonfederal 
funds (and similarly provided that the federal fund recipient could not editorialize), 
then that sort of dual model would be constitutional under Regan. Id. at 400. Given the 
absence of such a provision, however, the Court declined to follow Regan and held that 
the ban unconstitutionally limited grantee stations’ freedom of the press under the 
First Amendment. Id. at 402. 
 59 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991). Title X grantees filed suit against 
the Secretary of Health and Human Services, arguing that the restriction on abortion-
related speech and counseling was unconstitutional because the restriction conditioned 
receipt of the benefit of Title X funding on relinquishing a constitutional right to speak 
freely about abortion. Id. at 181, 196. 
 60 Id. at 178 (alterations in original) (internal quotations marks omitted). 
 61 Id. at 192-93 (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977)). Notably, 
the Court applied this same analysis in Regan. Regan v. Taxation with Representation 
of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 549 (1983). 
 62 Rust, 500 U.S. at 193. 
 63 Id. at 196. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
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could continue to “perform abortions, provide abortion-related 
services, and engage in abortion advocacy” so long as those 
activities were carried out “through programs that are separate 
and independent from the program that receives Title X 
funds”66—in other words, through an affiliate organization like 
the 501(c)(4) discussed in Regan. Finally, the Rust Court clearly 
articulated the scenarios in which an unconstitutional condition 
typically exists: “‘unconstitutional conditions’ cases involve 
situations in which the Government has placed a condition on 
the recipient of the subsidy rather than on a particular program 
or service, thus effectively prohibiting the recipient from 
engaging in the protected conduct outside the scope of the 
federally funded program.”67 The facts in Rust and the provisions 
of Title X revealed no such condition. The Court’s analysis laid the 
foundation for the development of the government speech doctrine 
as an exception to viewpoint-based discrimination. 
B. Viewpoint-Based Discrimination and the Government 
Speech Doctrine 
At its core, the First Amendment stands for freedom of 
expression, and it has given rise to jurisprudence that clearly 
states that the government may not discriminate against a 
certain viewpoint simply because it disagrees with it or deems 
that viewpoint to be unsavory.68 In other words, the government 
may not engage in viewpoint-based discrimination. Professor 
Geoffrey R. Stone illuminates the distinction between viewpoint-
based discrimination and content-neutral regulations through a 
  
 66 Id. (citing 42 C.F.R. § 59.9 (1989)). 
 67 Id. at 197. 
 68 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 
(1995) (“Discrimination against speech because of its message is presumed to be 
unconstitutional.”); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994) 
(“Government action that stifles speech on account of its message, or that requires the 
utterance of a particular message favored by the Government, contravenes [the First 
Amendment].”); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 386 (1992) (“The government 
may not regulate use based on hostility—or favoritism—towards the underlying 
message expressed.”); see also Joseph Blocher, Viewpoint Neutrality and Government 
Speech, 52 B.C. L. REV. 695, 703 (2011) (“The first rule of free speech theory and 
doctrine is that the government may not discriminate against a particular viewpoint 
based simply on its disagreement with that viewpoint.”); Elena Kagan, Private Speech, 
Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 413, 428 (1996) (“[T]he government may not restrict expressive activities 
because it disagrees with or disapproves of the ideas espoused by the speaker.”); Andy 
G. Olree, Identifying Government Speech, 42 CONN. L. REV. 365, 367 (2009) (“One of the 
most familiar axioms in all of First Amendment law is the general rule that the 
government is not allowed to restrict private expression based on viewpoint.”). 
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simple example: a law that bans all billboards is content neutral, 
whereas a law that bans “all criticism of the anti-billboard law” 
is viewpoint-based.69 The latter law is viewpoint-based because it 
restricts communication based on its content, and more 
specifically, based on the viewpoint in opposition to the anti-
billboard law.70 When a government regulation on private speech 
is viewpoint-based, then it is subject to strict scrutiny, and the 
government must show that the regulation is “narrowly tailored 
to serve a compelling government interest.”71 Such a restriction 
is almost always found to violate the First Amendment.72  
The critical issue in determining whether the 
government is engaged in viewpoint-based discrimination is 
best resolved by the following inquiry: What is the government’s 
purpose in regulating the speech in question?73 If the purpose of 
the restriction is to silence an unpopular viewpoint or a 
viewpoint the government disagrees with, then that restriction 
is unconstitutional.74 If, on the other hand, the purpose of the 
restriction is to ensure accurate portrayal of the government’s 
own policy or define the scope of a government program, then 
such a restriction, even if it is viewpoint-based, is 
constitutional.75 Today, this concept represents the core of the 
government speech doctrine. 
  
 69 Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 189, 197-98 (1983). 
 70 Id. at 198. 
 71 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 642 (“Our precedents thus apply the 
most exacting scrutiny to regulations that suppress, disadvantage, or impose 
differential burdens upon speech because of its content.”); see Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. 
Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 115-16 (1991); Perry Educ. 
Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (“For the [s]tate to enforce 
a content-based exclusion it must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a 
compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.”); Leslie 
Gielow Jacobs, Clarifying the Content-Based/Content Neutral and Content/Viewpoint 
Determinations, 34 MCGEORGE L. REV. 595, 596 (2003) (“A content-based government 
speech restriction receives the most rigorous scrutiny, which is almost always fatal.”); 
Kagan, supra note 68, at 443 (“Formulations of the standard used to review content-
based action vary, but the Court most often requires the government to show a 
compelling interest that could not be attained through less restrictive means. 
Application of this standard usually leads to a law’s invalidation.”). 
 72 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829; Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 641; 
Simon & Schuster, Inc., 502 U.S. at 116. 
 73 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 642 (“[T]he ‘principal inquiry in 
determining content neutrality . . . is whether the government has adopted a 
regulation of speech because of [agreement or] disagreement with the message it 
conveys.’” (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989))). 
 74 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828-29; Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 116; Police 
Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). 
 75 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833 (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194, 
196 (1991)). 
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Scholars and the Supreme Court alike identify Rust as 
the origin of the government speech doctrine,76 although Rust 
did not expressly name the doctrine. Rust held that the 
government could regulate private citizens’ speech as it related 
to a government-funded program.77 Under the government 
speech doctrine, when the government uses private speakers to 
convey a government position or viewpoint, it may limit the 
private speakers’ speech in order to ensure an accurate 
portrayal of the government’s position.78 In other words, the 
private speakers are conveying “government speech,” and the 
First Amendment “does not regulate government speech.”79  
For example, in Rust, the government chose to “selectively 
fund a program to encourage certain activities it believe[d] to be 
in the public interest, without at the same time funding an 
alternative program.”80 In particular, through Title X funding, 
the government promoted its view favoring preventative family 
planning over abortion. The regulations corresponding to Title 
X defined the scope of funded programs to exclude abortion and 
include preventative family planning measures.81 In turn, 
healthcare providers administering the programs on the ground 
conveyed the government message promoting preventative 
family planning, thereby articulating the government’s speech.82 
Accordingly, the regulations prohibiting Title X grantees from 
engaging in abortion-related speech were narrowly tailored to 
serve the programmatic purpose of Title X—to promote 
preventative family planning.83  
The government speech doctrine is paradoxical to the 
First Amendment. While the First Amendment prohibits 
viewpoint-based discrimination, the government speech doctrine 
  
 76 Id. at 833. Rosenberger articulated that public funding intended to 
facilitate expression through something like student publications, could not be 
conditioned on the content of that expression. Id. at 827-28. To do so constitutes 
unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. Id. at 834. Rosenberger noted, however, that 
when funding aims to facilitate expression of government viewpoints and perspectives 
through private speakers, as was the case with the Title X programs in Rust, then the 
government may impose conditions “to ensure that its message is neither garbled nor 
distorted by the grantee.” Id. at 833; Blocher, supra note 68 at 708; Daniel W. Park, 
Government Speech and the Public Forum: A Clash Between Democratic and 
Egalitarian Values, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 113, 124 (2009). 
 77 Park, supra note 76, at 125. 
 78 Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467-68 (2009) 
(citations omitted); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833. 
 79 Pleasant Grove City, Utah, 555 U.S. at 467. 
 80 Rust, 500 U.S. at 193. 
 81 Id. at 179-80. 
 82 Id. at 198-99. 
 83 Id. at 195 n.4 (1991); Park, supra note 76, at 126. 
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carves out a loophole and creates instances when the 
government can do just that: regulate speech related to a 
specific viewpoint when doing so is in the service of 
communicating the government’s own perspective.84 Quite 
simply, when there is government speech, the First Amendment 
and its concurrent regulations do not apply.  
The Supreme Court, however, has yet to offer clear 
guidelines on how to determine whether speech qualifies as 
government speech.85 The Court has dodged the question, 
stating in a recent case that “[t]here may be situations in which 
it is difficult to tell whether a government entity is speaking on 
its own behalf . . . , but this case does not present such a 
situation.”86 Justice Stevens, in his dissent from Pleasant Grove 
City, Utah v. Summum, described the government speech 
doctrine as “recently minted,”87 and Justice Souter cautioned 
that “it would do well for [the Supreme Court] to go slow in 
setting its bounds.”88 While the Supreme Court continues to 
sort out the boundaries and elements of government speech, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit developed what 
has become the leading test for identifying government 
speech.89 In Wells v. City and County of Denver, the Tenth 
Circuit considered four factors in determining whether speech 
qualifies as government speech:  
(1) the central “purpose” of the program in which the speech in question 
occurs; (2) the degree of “editorial control” exercised by the government 
or private entities over the content of the speech; (3) the identity of the 
“literal speaker”; and (4) whether the government or the private entity 
bears the “ultimate responsibility” for the content of the speech.90  
Justice O’Connor, sitting by designation on the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, adopted the Wells test,91 as has 
the Ninth Circuit.92 Whether the Leadership Act’s Policy 
  
 84 Olree, supra note 68, at 368 (“[I]f the speech is the government’s own 
speech, the viewpoint restrictions are permissible, but if the speech is private speech 
facilitated by government resources, viewpoint restrictions are generally 
impermissible.”). 
 85 Wells v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1140 (10th Cir. 2001). 
 86 Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 470 (2009). 
 87 Id. at 481. 
 88 Id. at 485. 
 89 Wells, 257 F.3d at 1140. 
 90 Turner v. City Council of Fredericksburg, Va., 534 F.3d 352, 354 (4th Cir. 
2008); accord Wells, 257 F.3d at 1141. 
 91 Turner, 534 F.3d at 354. 
 92 Ariz. Life Coal. Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 965 (9th Cir. 2008). 
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Requirement constitutes government speech lies at the heart of 
DKT International and AOSI.  
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
A.  DKT International v. U.S. Agency for International 
Development 
DKT is an NGO that engages in international family 
planning education and HIV/AIDS prevention; DKT is also a 
subgrantee of Family Health International (FHI).93 In June 
2005, FHI provided DKT with an agreement to operate a 
program that distributes condoms and condom lubricants, 
funded by USAID.94 The agreement included “a certification 
that ‘DKT has a policy explicitly opposing prostitution and sex 
trafficking.’”95 But DKT refused to adopt that policy and did not 
sign the agreement.96 As a result, FHI cancelled DKT’s grant 
and declined to provide DKT with additional funding.97  
DKT refused to adopt the anti-prostitution policy 
because it was concerned that doing so would “stigmatiz[e] and 
alienat[e]”98 sex workers, who are extremely vulnerable to 
contracting HIV/AIDS.99 DKT brought suit against USAID in the 
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging that the 
Policy Requirement violated DKT’s First Amendment rights by 
restraining its speech in other areas of work for which it did 
not receive federal funds. Additionally, DKT alleged that the 
Policy Requirement “force[d] DKT to convey a message with 
which it does not necessarily agree.”100 The district court sided 
with DKT, finding that the Policy Requirement violated the 
First Amendment because it “constitute[d] [a] view point based 
restriction[] on speech” and is “not narrowly tailored to further 
a compelling government interest.”101  
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit reversed.102 The court distinguished League of Women 
  
 93 DKT Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 477 F.3d 758, 760 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 94 Id.  
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. at 761. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. 
 101 DKT Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 435 F. Supp. 2d 5, 18 (D.D.C. 
2006), rev’d, 477 F.3d 758 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 102 DKT Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 477 F.3d 758, 759 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
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Voters and relied on Rust to find that when the government 
offers funding to promote its own policy—in this case, fighting 
HIV/AIDS and discouraging prostitution—then it may impose 
conditions to ensure that grantees deliver the government 
policy and do not engage in contrary behavior or convey 
contradictory messages.103 The D.C. Circuit supported its 
position by citing the government’s brief, which stated: 
It would make little sense for the government to provide billions of 
dollars to encourage the reduction of HIV/AIDS behavioral risks, 
including prostitution and sex trafficking, and yet to engage as 
partners in this effort organizations that are neutral toward or even 
actively promote the same practices sought to be eradicated. The 
effectiveness of the government’s viewpoint-based program would be 
substantially undermined, and the government’s message confused, 
if the organizations hired to implement that program by providing 
HIV/AIDS programs and services to the public could advance an 
opposite viewpoint in their privately-funded operations.104 
The court concluded that the Policy Requirement did 
not compel DKT to promote a certain policy, but created a 
condition whereby DKT had to “communicate the message”105 
behind the policy that the government chose to fund. The court 
therefore found the Policy Requirement to be constitutional.106  
B. Alliance for Open Society International v. U.S. Agency 
for International Development 
Four years after the D.C. Circuit Court found the Policy 
Requirement constitutional, the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit arrived at the opposite conclusion, holding that 
the Policy Requirement was unconstitutional.107 In AOSI, two 
NGOs, Pathfinder and AOSI, sought a preliminary injunction 
against USAID and HHS (among others), which would bar 
enforcement of the Policy Requirement.108 Pathfinder and AOSI 
argued that the Policy Requirement limited the work they could 
carry out with funding from private donors, and that it restricted 
their ability to express ideas that may be “insufficiently opposed 
to prostitution” under the Policy Requirement.109  
  
 103 Id. at 761-62. 
 104 Id. at 762-63 (quoting USAID brief). 
 105 Id. at 764. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 651 F.3d 
218, 223-24 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 928 (2013). 
 108 Id. at 225. 
 109 Id. 
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AOSI’s program, the Drug Demand Reduction Program, 
targets high-risk groups, including sex workers, to help contain 
the use of injection drugs in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and 
Kyrgyzstan.110 The program is funded by USAID and by a sizeable 
grant from the Open Society Institute.111 Pathfinder runs a 
number of programs addressing HIV/AIDS prevention, including 
a program in India that organizes sex workers, and educates 
and encourages them to engage in safe sex practices.112 The 
program also includes elements of community outreach that 
entail working with pimps and brothel owners.113  
In order to comply with the Policy Requirement, both 
AOSI and Pathfinder adopted policy statements opposing 
prostitution.114 Shortly thereafter, both NGOs filed suit against 
USAID.115 AOSI claimed that the Policy Requirement forced 
“the organization to engage in speech against its own will,”116 
and Pathfinder argued that the Policy Requirement prevented 
the organization from continuing its work in educating and 
organizing sex workers, which was made possible through 
private funding.117 Both organizations sought a declaratory 
judgment limiting the scope of the Policy Requirement’s 
application or, in the alternative, declaring the Policy 
Requirement unconstitutional.118  
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New 
York applied strict scrutiny to the Policy Requirement, finding 
that “when a spending enactment substantially impairs First 
Amendment protected activity conducted by private entities with 
private funds as a condition of receiving a government benefit, 
heightened scrutiny is warranted.”119 Under strict scrutiny 
analysis, the court asked whether the Policy Requirement was 
“narrowly tailored to fit Congress’s intent.”120 The court held that 
the Policy Requirement was not narrowly tailored because it 
acted as “a blanket ban on certain constitutionally protected 
  
 110 Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 430 F. Supp. 
2d 222, 230 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 651 F.3d at 228. 
 115 Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 2d at 237. 
 116 Id. at 238. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. at 259. 
 120 Id. at 267 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
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speech”121 without serving the government’s stated purpose of 
fighting HIV/AIDS.122 As a result, the court granted a 
preliminary injunction enjoining further enforcement of the 
Policy Requirement.123 
On appeal, the defendants informed the Second Circuit 
that they were developing guidelines that they believed would 
mitigate the constitutional issues underlying the Policy 
Requirement.124 The Second Circuit therefore remanded the case 
to the district court for findings on whether the preliminary 
injunction still constituted appropriate relief.125 On remand, the 
district court found that the injunction remained an appropriate 
remedy because, even though the guidelines appeared to bring 
the Policy Requirement in line with the dual structure approved 
in Rust, they nevertheless failed to address the fact that the 
Policy Requirement compelled speech.126 Accordingly, defendants’ 
revised guidelines failed to mitigate First Amendment concerns.127  
On appeal a second time, the Second Circuit affirmed 
the district court’s findings. The Second Circuit measured the 
Policy Requirement against the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine, finding that it far exceeded the funding conditions 
outlined in Regan, League of Women Voters, and Rust—cases in 
which the government prohibited funding recipients from 
engaging in certain types of speech.128 The court’s concern was 
not simply that the Policy Requirement limits speech, but that it 
compels speech.129 Moreover, the speech that the Policy 
Requirement compels is not neutral but is instead viewpoint-
based, because it requires Leadership Act grantees to espouse the 
government’s anti-prostitution perspective.130 As established in 
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia,131 
“viewpoint-based intrusions on free speech offend the First 
  
 121 Id. at 270. 
 122 Id. at 269. 
 123 Id. at 278. 
 124 Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 651 F.3d 
218, 226 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 928 (2013). 
 125 Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 254 F. App’x 843, 
846 (2d Cir. 2007), aff’d, 651 F.3d 218 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 928 (2013). 
 126 Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 570 F. Supp. 
2d 533, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d, 651 F.3d 218 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 
928 (2013). 
 127 Id. 
 128 Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 651 F.3d at 234. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. at 234-35. 
 131 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828-29 (1995). 
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Amendment.”132 Because the Policy Requirement compels 
viewpoint-based speech, the Second Circuit held that it was 
subject to heightened scrutiny.133 The court then found that the 
Policy Requirement was not narrowly tailored to serve the 
Leadership Act’s purpose of fighting HIV/AIDS.134 The court 
concluded that the Policy Requirement improperly compelled 
grantees to adopt and convey the government’s position 
opposing prostitution, and it found that Pathfinder and AOSI 
demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of their 
First Amendment claim.135 The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari for the case on January 11, 2013.136 
IV. ANALYSIS 
As established above, the Policy Requirement created a 
circuit split between the Second Circuit and the D.C. Circuit. 
This note contends that the D.C. Circuit’s analysis in DKT 
International erroneously classified the Policy Requirement as 
government speech—by equating it with the Title X speech 
restrictions that the Court deemed acceptable in Rust—and 
therefore bestowed upon it the concomitant allowance of 
viewpoint-based discrimination.137 The Second Circuit, on the 
other hand, recognized the Policy Requirement as an 
impermissible viewpoint-based restriction on private speech, one 
that is overly broad and fails to serve the underlying purpose of 
the Leadership Act—to eradicate HIV/AIDS.138 The Second 
Circuit’s analysis represents not only a logical extension of the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine, but also a strong public-
policy decision that supports the global battle against HIV/AIDS.  
A. The Purpose of the Leadership Act and the Policy 
Requirement 
To determine the constitutionality of the Policy 
Requirement and its proper categorization as either viewpoint-
based discrimination or government speech, it is necessary, 
first, to examine its purpose within the context of the 
  
 132 Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 651 F.3d at 235 (citing Rosenberger, 515 
U.S. at 828). 
 133 Id. at 236. 
 134 Id. at 237. 
 135 Id. at 239.  
 136 Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, 133 S. Ct. 928, 928 (2013). 
 137 DKT Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 477 F.3d 758, 763-64 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 138 Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 651 F.3d at 237-39. 
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Leadership Act as a whole.139 The bottom line is that the purpose 
of the Leadership Act is to strengthen U.S. leadership and efficacy 
in an ongoing, global battle against HIV/AIDS.140 To achieve this 
goal, the Leadership Act provides for consideration of gender 
equity issues and targeted outreach toward vulnerable 
populations.141 Sex workers constitute a vulnerable population, 
and Congress points to the sex industry as one of the causes of 
the HIV/AIDS epidemic.142 Additionally, and quite significantly, 
the Leadership Act explicitly recognizes that NGOs have 
valuable on-the-ground experience and expertise, which make 
them a critical part of the U.S. effort to reduce the spread of 
HIV/AIDS.143  
Within the context of the Leadership Act’s overarching 
purpose to eradicate HIV/AIDS, the Policy Requirement simply 
does not belong. On its face, the Policy Requirement might 
appear to further the Leadership Act’s consideration of gender 
equity issues—after all, the Policy Requirement condemns 
prostitution and any support of prostitution, seemingly in 
support of women’s autonomy.144 Moreover, prostitution is nearly 
universally abhorred. But, this is an oversimplification. The 
Policy Requirement is actually the manifestation of conservative 
political ideologies, which Republican and Democratic 
representatives hotly debated while drafting the statute. 
Republican desires to include the requirement divorced the 
ideal of ending prostitution from the reality of preventing and 
combating HIV/AIDS. This ratification of conservative ideals 
subsequently tied the hands of the NGOs that Congress 
wanted to partner with. 
Republican Congressman Chris Smith, known for his 
strong pro-life politics and socially conservative perspective, 
introduced the Policy Requirement as an amendment to the 
Leadership Act, and the House Committee on International 
Relations approved the amendment by a slim margin, “24 ayes 
to 22 noes.”145 After approval by both the House of 
Representatives and the Senate, the Leadership Act returned 
  
 139 See supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text. 
 140 22 U.S.C.A. § 7603 (West 2012). 
 141 Id. § 7601(21)(C). 
 142 Id. § 7601(23).  
 143 Id. §§ 7601(18), 7621(a)(2)-(4). 
 144 Id. § 7631(f). 
 145 H.R. REP. NO. 108-60, at 29 (2003); Aziza Ahmed, Feminism, Power, and 
Sex Work in the Context of HIV/AIDS: Consequences for Women’s Health, 34 HARV. J. 
L. & GENDER 225, 243 (2011). 
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to the House for final approval of amendments proposed by the 
Senate. During that session, Congressman Todd Akin (R-NJ) 
voiced additional support for the Policy Requirement, stating, 
“We have received word that there are groups who actively 
promote prostitution on their Web site, that they have received 
U.S. tax dollars in the past, and that is why [the Policy 
Requirement] is important and why it must be enforced.”146 In 
his statement of support, however, Congressman Akin did not 
offer any evidence of how grantees promoted prostitution.147  
Opposition to the Policy Requirement came solely from the 
other side of the aisle. Democratic Congressman José Serrano (D-
NY) cautioned that the amendment was “overreaching” and “too 
broad.”148 Congresswoman Barbara Lee (D-CA) characterized 
the Policy Requirement as “a bad piece of public health policy” 
and proceeded to describe it as “counterproductive to achieving 
our long term goals of reducing the spread of the disease, and 
treating those already infected.”149 Finally, Congresswoman Lee 
cut to the heart of the Policy Requirement, articulating the 
issue that has become the core of the dispute between NGOs 
and USAID: “How can an organization that is seeking to 
mitigate the risk of infection for sex workers reach out to these 
women when we require them to have an affirmative policy in 
place that would turn these very women away from receiving 
education and treatment for HIV/AIDS?”150  
Nicholas Kristof, New York Times columnist, author, 
and human rights advocate, suggests that feminist ideologies, 
morality, and most importantly, politics, create division over a 
fact that both sides of the aisle actually agree on—that child 
prostitution and forced prostitution are horrendous realities.151 
This note argues that the Policy Requirement represents just 
such a division. Professor Aziza Ahmed and the Guttmacher 
Institute, a sexual and reproductive health policy institute, 
liken the Policy Requirement to other socially conservative 
policies such as the “Global Gag Rule,” which required 
international organizations receiving U.S.-based financial 
  
 146 150 CONG. REC. H5348, 5357 (July 8, 2004) (statement of Rep. Todd Akin 
(R-MO) commenting on the Policy Requirement). 
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. at 5358 (statement of Rep. José Serrano (D-NY) opposing the Policy 
Requirement). 
 149 Id. (statement of Rep. Barbara Lee (D-CA) opposing the Policy Requirement). 
 150 Id. 
 151 KRISTOF & WUDUNN, supra note 1, at 25. 
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assistance to denounce and dissociate themselves from abortion 
and promote abstinence-based sex education.152  
In addition to the fact that the Policy Requirement 
represents partisan perspectives, the Leadership Act specifically 
provides for its inconsistent application, further highlighting its 
lack of functionality. The Leadership Act carves out an 
exception to the Policy Requirement for the Global Fund to 
Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria; the World Health 
Organization; the International AIDS Vaccine Initiative; and any 
United Nations agency.153 This exception is quite large, and it 
applies to agencies carrying out work that is nearly identical to 
that of AOSI, DKT International, and Pathfinder International.  
For example, the United Nations Population Fund 
(UNFPA)—a United Nations agency that describes its mission 
as “promot[ing] the right of every woman, man and child to 
enjoy a life of health and equal opportunity”154—is exempt from 
the Policy Requirement, even though UNFPA regularly engages 
with sex workers as part of its work to combat HIV/AIDS. 
UNFPA’s work involves HIV prevention among vulnerable 
populations, including sex workers.155 In fact, UNFPA actually 
works alongside Pathfinder International, one of the plaintiffs in 
AOSI, as part of the Maternal Health Task Force, a collaborative 
effort by like-minded organizations to address maternal morbidity 
and mortality and their related causes, such as HIV/AIDS.156  
In this manner, the Policy Requirement’s purpose is 
further called into question because the requirement works 
against one of the stated aims of the Leadership Act—to 
intensify public–private partnerships as part of the strategy to 
combat HIV/AIDS.157 In effect, the Policy Requirement ties the 
hands of NGOs engaged in critical HIV/AIDS-focused work on 
  
 152 Ahmed, supra note 145, at 242-43; Susan A. Cohen, Ominous Convergence: 
Sex Trafficking, Prostitution and International Family Planning, 8 GUTTMACHER REP. 
ON PUB. POL’Y, Feb. 2005, at 12, available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/tgr/08/ 
1/gr080112.html.  
 153 22 U.S.C.A. § 7631(f) (West 2008). 
 154 Population Issues Overview, UNFPA, http://web.unfpa.org/issues/index.htm 
(last visited Feb. 14, 2013).  
 155 Preventing HIV/AIDS, Focus on Especially Vulnerable Groups, UNFPA, 
http://www.unfpa.org/hiv/groups.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2013). Ironically, the 
Leadership Act cites UNAID as its source for statistics on HIV/AIDS and gender, even 
though UNAID’s work is spearheaded by UNFPA, whose work would not comply with the 
Policy Requirement if it were to be applied to UNFPA. 22 U.S.C.A. § 7601(36)(A)-(C). 
 156 Mission, MATERNAL HEALTH TASK FORCE, http://maternalhealthtaskforce.org/ 
component/content/article/1-pages/23-mhtf-mission (last visited Feb. 27, 2013); see also The 
MHTF Partner Channel, MATERNAL HEALTH TASK FORCE, http://maternalhealthtaskforce.org/ 
collaborate-1/partners (last visited Feb. 27, 2013). 
 157 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 7603(4), 7621(b)(1)-(2). 
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the ground.158 Even though the Leadership Act recognizes that 
NGOs possess expertise and knowledge that are critical to 
effectively reduce the spread and transmission of HIV/AIDS,159 
the Policy Requirement blocks NGOs from exercising their best 
practices. Such contradictions within the Leadership Act 
indicate that the Policy Requirement does not further the goals 
of the Leadership Act itself, but rather functions as an 
expression of a conservative viewpoint. 
B. The Policy Requirement Constitutes Viewpoint 
Discrimination and Is Unconstitutional Under the First 
Amendment 
As discussed in Part II.B, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
repeatedly held that the government may not regulate private 
speech when its primary purpose is to quash a particular 
viewpoint.160 When a regulation on speech is viewpoint-based, it 
is subject to strict scrutiny—that is, the regulation is 
presumptively unconstitutional unless the government can show 
that the regulation is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling 
governmental interest.161 As outlined in Part IV.A, the Policy 
Requirement serves no functional purpose within the Leadership 
Act, let alone a compelling governmental interest. As a result, the 
Policy Requirement fails the threshold requirement for a finding 
of constitutionality under strict scrutiny analysis.  
But, even if we were to suppose that it serves a 
compelling governmental interest, the Policy Requirement and 
its corresponding guidelines are far too broad to qualify as a 
narrowly tailored legislative program under a strict scrutiny 
analysis. Although the Policy Requirement seems straightforward 
in its call for “a policy explicitly opposing prostitution and sex 
trafficking,”162 its corresponding guidelines call for grantees to 
maintain “objective integrity and independence from any 
  
 158 Jodi Jacobson, UPDATED: Federal Appeals Court Overturns United States 
“Prostitution Pledge” for U.S. Groups; Int’l Orgs Still Subject to Pledge, RH REALITY 
CHECK (July 6, 2011, 8:00 PM), http://www.rhrealitycheck.org/blog/2011/07/06/federal-
appeals-court-overturns-united-states-prostitution-pledge (“[P]rograms that might 
otherwise [have] been funded were dropped, irrespective of whether the strategies 
involved had been proven to reduce the spread of HIV. Moreover, programs recognized 
around the world for their successes in working with marginalized populations such as 
sex workers and other marginalized populations have been de-funded.”). 
 159 22 U.S.C.A. § 7621(a), (b). 
 160 See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text. 
 161 See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 162 22 U.S.C.A. § 7631(f). 
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affiliated organization that engages in activities inconsistent 
with the recipient’s opposition to the practices of prostitution 
and sex trafficking . . . .”163 These guidelines, however, fail to 
define what types of activities are “inconsistent” with the anti-
prostitution policy statement.  
In fact, after hearing oral arguments in AOSI, the 
Second Circuit noted that it had “the distinct impression that 
not even Defendants have a grasp on what it means to engage 
in expression that is ‘inconsistent’ with an opposition to 
prostitution.”164 Indeed, AOSI, shortly after adopting its anti-
prostitution policy statement, sought confirmation from USAID 
that the policy statement complied with the Policy Requirement.165 
But this query yielded little clarification. AOSI claimed that 
Kent Hill, Acting Assistant Administrator for Global Health at 
USAID, offered the following guidance: “(1) organizations that 
promoted the legalization of prostitution would violate the 
requirement and (2) organizations that limited their activities 
to providing health services to prostitutes would be in 
compliance.”166 According to the district court’s opinion, Hill was 
unable to offer any further information about activities that 
might fall in between those two positions.167 When even a 
USAID official charged with enforcing the Policy Requirement 
cannot articulate exactly what it demands of grantees, that 
requirement and its affiliated regulations cannot be characterized 
as “narrowly tailored.” Therefore, under strict scrutiny analysis, 
the Policy Requirement should be held to represent 
unconstitutional viewpoint-based discrimination.168  
  
 163 45 C.F.R. § 89.3 (2010). 
 164 Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 651 F.3d 
218, 240 n.8 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 928 (2013). 
 165 Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 430 F. Supp. 
2d 222, 235-36 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, 651 F.3d 218 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. 
Ct. 928 (2013). 
 166 Id. at 236. 
 167 Id. 
 168 For additional scholarship on how the Policy Requirement constitutes 
viewpoint-based discrimination, see Garima Malhotra, Good Intentions, Bad 
Consequences: How Congress’s Efforts to Eradicate HIV/AIDS Stifle the Speech of 
Humanitarian Organizations, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 839 (2012). Other scholars have 
argued that the Policy Requirement does not constitute viewpoint-based 
discrimination, but rather, that it is a straightforward coercive penalty, an 
unconstitutional conditional government subsidy. See Alexander P. Wentworth-Ping, 
Funding Conditions and Free Speech for HIV/AIDS NGOs: He Who Pays the Piper 
Cannot Always Call the Tune, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1097, 1144 (2012). For the reasons 
outlined above, however, I disagree with that assessment and view the Policy 
Requirement as clear viewpoint-based discrimination. 
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C. Anti-Prostitution Policy Statements Are Not Government 
Speech 
Because viewpoint-based discrimination is constitutional 
only in the context of government speech, the Policy Requirement 
will be deemed constitutional only if an organization’s anti-
prostitution policy statement qualifies as government speech. To 
determine whether the anti-prostitution policy statement may 
qualify as government speech, the Tenth Circuit offers a four-
factor test under which a court must consider:  
(1) the central “purpose” of the program in which the speech in question 
occurs; (2) the degree of “editorial control” exercised by the government 
or private entities over the content of the speech; (3) the identity of the 
“literal speaker”; and (4) whether the government or the private entity 
bears the “ultimate responsibility” for the content of the speech.169  
I will examine each element in turn. 
The DKT International court improperly characterized 
the Policy Requirement as reflective of the government’s 
purpose in the Leadership Act.170 According to the D.C. Circuit, 
the governmental purpose of the Policy Requirement is to 
“eradicate HIV/AIDS” by “speak[ing] out against legalizing 
prostitution in other countries.”171 This characterization allowed 
the court to conclude that, through the Policy Requirement, 
“the government’s own message is being delivered.”172 The D.C. 
Circuit found that the viewpoint-based Policy Requirement is 
constitutional, because it represents “criteria to ensure that [the 
government’s] message is conveyed in an efficient and effective 
fashion.”173 The D.C. Circuit mischaracterized the Leadership Act 
as legislation that is meant to convey the government’s message 
opposing prostitution.174 This “recast[s] a condition on funding as 
a mere definition” of the government program—a tactic that the 
Supreme Court has rejected explicitly.175 The section of the 
Leadership Act that defines its purpose makes no mention of 
prostitution whatsoever.176 In contrast, the purpose of the 
  
 169 Turner v. City Council of Fredericksburg, Va., 534 F.3d 352, 354 (4th Cir. 
2008); accord Wells v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1141 (10th Cir. 2001). 
 170 DKT Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 477 F.3d 758, 761 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 171 Id. 
 172 Id. at 762 (quoting Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 
(2001)) (analogizing to Rust). 
 173 Id. 
 174 See DKT Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 477 F.3d 758, 761 (D.C. 
Cir. 2007). 
 175 Legal Servs. Corp., 531 U.S. at 547.  
 176 22 U.S.C.A. § 7603 (West 2012). 
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Leadership Act and the NGO programs it funds is to strengthen 
U.S. leadership in the effort to eradicate HIV/AIDS, increase 
resources available to fight HIV/AIDS, and increase access to 
healthcare and treatments.177  
The second element of the Tenth Circuit’s government 
speech test, which evaluates the degree of editorial control 
exercised by the government or the private party, also supports 
a conclusion that the anti-prostitution policy statement is not 
government speech. The NGOs, not the government, maintained 
editorial control over the anti-prostitution policy statements. The 
Leadership Act does not dictate what the policy statements must 
say, and the regulations that HHS promulgated do not clarify 
the Policy Requirement’s meaning.178 Unlike DKT 
International,179 AOSI and Pathfinder each adopted their own 
individualized policy statements. AOSI’s policy statement read: 
AOSI and the Soros Foundation in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan 
believe that trafficking and sex work do harm both to the individuals 
directly involved and to others in various ways. AOSI and the Soros 
Foundations in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan do not promote or 
advocate such activities. Rather, our approach is to try to reduce the 
harms caused by disseminating credible information on questions 
such as the prevention of disease, and by providing direct public 
health assistance to vulnerable populations . . . .180 
Pathfinder’s policy statement read: 
In order to be eligible for federal funding for HIV/AIDS, Pathfinder 
opposes prostitution and sex trafficking because of the harm they cause 
primarily to women. Pathfinder’s HIV/AIDS programs seek to promote 
effective ways to prevent the transmission of HIV/AIDS and to reduce 
the suffering caused by HIV/AIDS. In order to achieve these goals, 
Pathfinder works with, and provides assistance and support to and for, 
many vulnerable groups, including women who are commercial sex 
workers, who, if not effectively reached by HIV/AIDS programs, will 
suffer and can become drivers of the HIV/AIDS epidemic.181 
Both the absence of regulatory guidance about the contents of 
the policy statement and the distinct statements adopted by 
AOSI and Pathfinder signal that the federal government did 
not exercise control over the editorial content of the policy 
statement. Similarly, under the third factor, it is clear that the 
  
 177 Id. 
 178 See id. § 7631(f); 45 C.F.R. § 89.3 (2010). 
 179 DKT Int’l, 477 F.3d at 761. 
 180 Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 430 F. Supp. 
2d 222, 235 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (citations omitted). 
 181 Id. at 237. 
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anti-prostitution policy statements are not government speech. 
Indeed, the Leadership Act grantees published the policy 
statements in their capacity as private organizations, in order 
to retain their funding; the government was not the speaker 
behind the individual policy statements. 
The fourth and final factor, which requires 
consideration of who bears the ultimate responsibility for the 
speech in question, also supports a finding that the anti-
prostitution policy statements do not qualify as government 
speech. The Tenth Circuit and Fourth Circuit cases, however, 
shed little light on how to best conduct this analysis. These 
cases provided rather clear facts that left little doubt that the 
speech in question was government speech.182 While the 
government may contend that it bears the ultimate 
responsibility for any anti-prostitution policy statement because 
it provides funding for HIV/AIDS eradication programs, 
common sense indicates that the NGOs are ultimately 
accountable, because they must deal with the consequences of 
the policy statement. These consequences include ostracizing 
the vulnerable populations that they wish to serve or losing 
additional funding from private donors.  
The dissent in Wells v. City and County of Denver 
advocated consideration of an additional factor in determining 
who bears the ultimate responsibility related to the policy 
statement: “who the listener believes to be the speaker.”183 In 
this case, the listener or reader would reasonably believe that 
the “speaker” for an anti-prostitution policy statement is the 
NGO that published the statement. For example, AOSI’s policy 
statement made no reference to the fact that it published the 
policy statement solely to ensure retention of Leadership Act 
funding.184 Although Pathfinder did qualify its policy statement 
with the language “[i]n order to be eligible for federal funding 
for HIV/AIDS, Pathfinder opposes prostitution,”185 such a 
disclaimer does not negate the fact that in its own materials 
Pathfinder still took a public position opposing prostitution. 
  
 182 Turner v. City Council of Fredericksburg, Va., 534 F.3d 352, 354 (4th Cir. 
2008) (finding that the government retained the ultimate responsibility for a prayer 
spoken by a City Councilman, in his capacity as a City Councilman, at the beginning of 
a City Council meeting); Wells v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1142 (10th 
Cir. 2001) (finding Denver retained ultimate responsibility over a Happy Holidays sign 
because it was created by the city of Denver, secured by the city of Denver, and 
surrounded by a fence erected by the city of Denver). 
 183 Wells, 257 F.3d at 1155. 
 184 See Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, 430 F. Supp. 2d at 235-37. 
 185 Id. at 237. 
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Quite simply, there is no reason that a reader of an anti-
prostitution policy statement would believe that the government, 
rather than the NGO, is the true source of the anti-prostitution 
policy statement.  
Professor Leslie Gielow Jacobs suggests that a deeper 
analysis is warranted in order to determine who bears ultimate 
responsibility for the speech in question, which she characterizes 
as “accountability.”186 Jacobs argues that government speech will 
be illegitimate unless the government “adequately inform[s]” the 
public that that the government “is speaking through private 
speakers and provid[ing] the content” that is being expressed.187 
Jacobs assesses whether the government has adequately 
informed the public of its intent to speak by examining whether 
the government meets two requirements: (1) “general 
accountability” and (2) “specific accountability.”188 The general 
accountability requirement asks whether the government 
authorized the speech in question “in a legitimate and publicly 
visible process,”189 such as valid enactment of a piece of 
legislation. This requirement is generally easy to satisfy, and 
because the Leadership Act constitutes a validly enacted piece 
of legislation, it meets this first requirement.  
The specific accountability requirement is less easily 
satisfied, because it focuses on the audience’s interpretation of 
the speech in question, rather than on the process through 
which the legislation was enacted.190 Jacobs argues that when 
speech targets a specific population, “the government must 
make them reasonably aware . . . of the source of the 
communication and its content.”191 For example, in Rust, the 
Court held that the structure of the preventative family 
planning program itself provided adequate notice to the public 
that doctors’ silence pertaining to abortion reflected the 
program’s intent—preventative family planning—not the 
doctors’ personal beliefs.192 Jacobs contends, however, that such 
notice is insufficient, particularly when the audience members 
  
 186 Jacobs suggests consideration of three factors to determine whether or not 
speech qualifies as government speech: “accountability for speaking, identifiable 
message, and non-speech-suppressing impact.” Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Who’s Talking? 
Disentangling Government and Private Speech, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 35, 56 (2002). 
 187 Id. at 57. 
 188 Id. 
 189 Id. 
 190 Id. at 61 n.189. 
 191 Id. at 61. 
 192 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991). 
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are average individuals.193 Jacobs reasons that when the 
audience members lack legal training and no reason to believe 
that the message reflects a government message, “the 
government should be required to make clear to individual 
listeners that it is influencing the private speakers’ message.”194  
The Policy Requirement has no provision to ensure that 
readers of an NGO’s anti-prostitution policy statement are 
aware that it reflects a government message rather than the 
message of an NGO. Further, the “audience” in this case likely 
consists of sex workers, other NGOs, or potential donors. It is 
unlikely that these constituencies would presume the anti-
prostitution policy statement reflected anything other than the 
organization’s own policy. Therefore, the government’s failure 
to disclose its role in the promulgation of anti-prostitution 
policies does not meet Jacobs’s specific accountability 
requirement.  
Under Jacobs’s accountability framework or the Wells 
dissent’s additional factor of “who the listener believes to be the 
speaker,”195 it is clear that NGOs, not the government, retain 
ultimate responsibility for the content of their anti-prostitution 
policy statements. In fact, a report authored by the Center for 
Public Health and Human Rights at Johns Hopkins University 
suggests that the Policy Requirement in several instances has 
already had negative implications for Leadership Act grantees.196 
Under both the four-factor test adopted by the circuit courts and 
additional frameworks that have been proposed, anti-
prostitution policy statements do not qualify as government 
speech. As a result, they are subject to regulation under the 
  
 193 Jacobs makes a distinction between Velazquez, in which the judges were 
the audience (and lawyers’ speech was restricted) and Rust, in which the audience was 
comprised of indigent patients seeking family planning advice and who likely had no 
expertise in law. Jacobs, supra note 186, at 62. 
 194 Id. at 63. 
 195 Wells v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1155 (10th Cir. 2001). 
 196 Nicole Franck Masenior & Chris Beyrer, The US Anti-Prostitution Pledge: 
First Amendment Challenges and Public Health Priorities, 4 PLOS MED. 1158, 1160 
(2007). The Lotus Project was an initiative run by an organization who received 
Leadership Act funding from USAID. The Lotus Project, based in Cambodia, provided 
health services and skills training to sex workers. After a crackdown on brothels in the 
area changed the dynamics around sex work, sex workers (many of whom said they 
worked in the sex trade voluntarily) had restricted mobility and limited access to 
health care services. The Lotus Project was unable to respond effectively to the change 
in scenario—it feared that a response and delivery of health services per best practices 
would be interpreted to be promotion of prostitution and would result in a loss of 
funding. In the end, funding from USAID decreased and the Lotus Project eventually 
ceased operations. Id. 
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First Amendment and, as discussed above, represent 
unconstitutional viewpoint-based discrimination.197 
D. The Policy Requirement and Its Policy Implications 
The international development community has 
protested the Policy Requirement since its inception. Although 
not all NGOs have filed suits like AOSI, Pathfinder, and DKT 
International, members of the international reproductive-health 
community stood in solidarity and voiced their displeasure with 
the Policy Requirement. In 2009, twenty-one NGOs sent a letter 
to HHS Secretary Kathleen Sebelius offering comments on the 
Policy Requirement.198 In that letter, organizations such as 
CARE, the Guttmacher Institute, the International Women’s 
Health Coalition, and Ipas-USA stated that the Policy 
Requirement undermines the true goal of the Leadership Act—
to reduce the spread of HIV/AIDS worldwide.199 Importantly, 
the NGOs called attention to what in many ways is the crux of 
the HIV/AIDS pandemic: it “is difficult[ and] complicated.”200  
The Policy Requirement fails to appreciate the nuanced 
problem the HIV/AIDS pandemic presents and instead takes a 
dull knife to a multifaceted, amorphous problem that requires 
a scalpel. Prostitution is terrible. Many, if not most, women 
and girls enter into a life of prostitution against their will.201 
The goal of reducing prostitution and its negative consequences 
is a valid one, but it is neither the main goal of the Leadership 
Act nor one that will be achieved by forcing NGOs to adopt policy 
statements that ostracize and cast judgment on the women and 
girls who desperately need the services, programming, and 
support that NGOs provide around the world. 
A representative from an NGO that was working to help 
Bangladeshi sex workers gain the right to wear shoes outside 
of brothels posed a simple question about the Policy 
Requirement: “How can we help these beaten down, 
  
 197 See supra Part III.B. 
 198 Letter from AIDS Foundation of Chicago et al., Comments on Office of Global 
Health Affairs; Regulation on the Organizational Integrity of Entities Implementing 
Leadership Act Programs and Activities, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, to Kathleen 
Sebelius, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. (Nov. 23, 2009), available at 
http://www.brennancenter.org/page/-/Justice/AJLawsuits/20091223.Groups_Comments.pdf.  
 199 Id. at 1. 
 200 Id. (emphasis added). 
 201 See KRISTOF & WUDUNN, supra note 1, at 3-46 (describing the process by 
which human trafficking operations smuggle girls across borders, deliver them to 
brothels and effectively doom them to a life of modern slavery). 
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marginalized women organize themselves to achieve such 
victories if we are publicly opposing what they do to earn 
money?”202 As it stands now, the Policy Requirement is a single-
minded approach to a problem that requires comprehensive, 
holistic, and culturally sensitive responses, not only to the sex 
industry, but also to the other illicit industries that support 
it—such as the human trafficking industry. Holly Burkhalter, 
the former policy director of Physicians for Human Rights and 
its Health Action AIDS Campaign, noted that sound health 
policy requires several components.203 First, a sound health 
policy requires efforts to assist and liberate women and girls 
engaged in the sex industry.204 Second, it requires providing 
healthcare services and protection for women and girls who 
remain in the sex industry and who continue to need help.205  
CONCLUSION 
The Policy Requirement fails on many fronts. It fails to 
further the goal of the Leadership Act—the eradication of 
HIV/AIDS. It regulates speech in order to quash a viewpoint 
that favors actual, on-the-ground human rights and needs over 
sweeping judgments that carry no practicable effect. As a 
result, the Policy Requirement is unconstitutional viewpoint-
based discrimination that violates NGOs’ rights under the First 
Amendment. The analysis put forth by the Second Circuit in 
AOSI properly characterizes the Policy Requirement as 
impermissible viewpoint-based discrimination. In contrast, the 
D.C. Circuit’s characterization of the Policy Requirement as 
government speech misconstrues the central purpose of the 
Leadership Act, as well as the Policy Requirement’s purpose 
within the Leadership Act as a whole.  
The Supreme Court will soon decide on the 
constitutionality of the Policy Requirement, and I urge the 
Court to adopt the Second Circuit’s reasoning. To do so would 
represent not only a logical extension of the Court’s previous 
unconstitutional conditions and viewpoint-based discrimination 
jurisprudence, but it would also represent a strong policy  
 
  
 202 Holly Burkhalter, Better Health, Better Lives for Sex Workers, WASH. POST, 
Dec. 8, 2003, at A25 (internal quotation marks omitted), available at 2003 WLNR 19309301. 
 203 Id. 
 204 Id. 
 205 Id. 
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decision that favors empowering NGOs to change the reality of 
HIV/AIDS rather than adopting a singular focus that only 
changes the laws. 
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